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Abstract
We investigate whether liquidity is an important price factor in the US corporate bond market.
In particular, we focus on whether liquidity effects are more pronounced in periods of financial
crises, especially for bonds with high credit risk, using a unique data set covering more
than 20,000 bonds, between October 2004 and December 2008. We employ a wide range
of liquidity measures and find that liquidity effects account for approximately 14% of the
explained market-wide corporate yield spread changes. We conclude that the economic impact
of the liquidity measures is significantly larger in periods of crisis, and for speculative grade
bonds.
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11. Introduction
The global financial crisis had its origins in the US subprime mortgage market in 2006–2007,
but has since spread to virtually every financial market around the world. The most important
aspect of this crisis, which sharply distinguishes it from previous crises, is the rapidity and degree
to which both the liquidity and credit quality of several asset classes deteriorated. While clearly
both liquidity and credit risk are key determinants of asset prices, in general, it is important to
quantify their relative effects and, particularly, how much they changed during the crisis. It is also
relevant to ask if there are interactions between these factors, and whether these relations changed
substantially in magnitude and quality from prior periods. In this paper, we study liquidity effects
in the US corporate bond market for the period October 2004 to December 2008, including the
GM/Ford downgrades and the subprime crisis, using a unique data set covering basically the whole
US corporate bond market. We employ a wide range of liquidity measures to quantify the liquidity
effects in corporate bond yield spreads. Our analysis explores the time-series and cross-sectional
aspects of liquidity for the whole market, as well as various important segments, using panel and
Fama-MacBeth regressions, respectively.
Most major financial markets, including those for equity, foreign exchange, credit, and com-
modities, were severely affected in terms of price and liquidity in the subprime crisis. However,
the impact has been disproportionately felt in the fixed income markets, including the markets
for collateralized debt obligations (CDO), credit default swaps (CDS), and corporate bonds. An
important point to note is that these securities are usually traded in over-the-counter (OTC) mar-
kets, where there is no central market place, or even a clearing house. Indeed, this aspect has
come under regulatory scrutiny since the near collapse of the CDS market, which was an opaque
OTC market. It is the OTC structure of fixed income markets that makes research, especially on
liquidity effects, difficult as traded prices and volumes are not readily available, and important
aspects of the markets can only be analyzed based on quotations from individual dealers, which
are not necessarily representative of the market as a whole.
US corporate bonds trade in an important OTC market. This market is an ideal laboratory
to examine liquidity and credit factors because of the following reasons: First, in contrast to most
other OTC markets, detailed transaction data are available on prices, volumes, and other market
variables since 2004, through an effort of the Financial Industry Regulatory Agency (FINRA),
known as the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE). This database aggregates vir-
tually all transactions in the US corporate bond market, which is unusual for any OTC market.
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deterioration, almost to the same extent as the credit derivatives market, to which it is linked
by arbitrage and hedging activities. Third, there is considerable variation in credit quality as
well as liquidity in this market, both over time and across bonds, providing researchers with the
opportunity to examine the differences arising out of changes in liquidity.
For our empirical analysis, we use all traded prices from TRACE, along with market valuations
from Markit, bond characteristics from Bloomberg, and credit ratings from Standard & Poor’s.
Our combined data set is perhaps the most comprehensive one of the US corporate bond market
that has been assembled to date, covering 23,703 bonds and 3,261 firms. This data set enables us
to study liquidity effects for virtually the whole bond market, including bond segments that show
very low trading activity.
The main focus of our research in this paper is to determine the quantitative impact of liquidity
factors, while controlling for credit risk, based on credit ratings and other risk characteristics. In
our analysis, we focus on the yield spread of a corporate bond, defined as its yield differential
relative to that of a risk-free benchmark of similar duration. The benchmark could be either the
Treasury bond or the swap rate curve.
To measure liquidity, we consider several alternative proxies for liquidity. We employ bond
characteristics that have been used as liquidity proxies in many studies. We use directly observable
trading activity variables (e.g., the number of trades) and, most important, we employ several
alternative liquidity measures proposed in the literature, i.e., the Amihud, Roll, zero-return, and
price dispersion measure.
First, we explore the hypothesis that liquidity is priced in the US corporate bond market. We
find that the liquidity proxies account for about 14% of the explained time-series variation of the
yield spread changes over time for individual bonds, while controlling for credit quality. Most
of the liquidity proxies exhibit statistically as well as economically significant results. While the
trading activity variables are important in explaining the bond yield spread changes, the liquidity
measures exhibit even stronger effects in terms of economic impact. In particular, measures
estimating trading costs based on transaction data show the strongest effects.
Second, our main research question is whether the effect of liquidity is stronger in times of
crises. Our hypothesis is that in crises, when capital constraints become binding and inventory
holding costs and search costs rise dramatically, liquidity effects are more pronounced. Therefore,
we analyze credit and liquidity effects for three different regimes during our sample period, i.e.,
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more normal. Based on time-series analysis, we find that the effect of the liquidity measures is
far stronger in both the GM/Ford crisis and the subprime crisis: the economic significance of the
liquidity proxies increased by 30% in the GM/Ford crisis compared to the normal period, and
more than doubled in the subprime crisis. We also examine the cross-sectional behavior of the
yield spread using Fama-MacBeth regressions in the three different time periods. In general, the
cross-sectional results paint a picture similar to the time-series analysis. Moreover, we find in the
cross-section that time-invariant bond characteristics, e.g., amount issued, show significant effects
as well.
Third, we analyze the interaction between credit and liquidity risk. We expect to find higher
liquidity in the investment grade sector if liquidity concerns cause investors to abandon the junk
bond market in favor of investment grade bonds in a flight-to-quality. We present descriptive
statistics providing evidence for a flight-to-quality during financial distress and the regression
analysis indeed shows lower liquidity for speculative grade bonds as well as a stronger reaction to
changes in liquidity. In general, these results indicate that the liquidity component is far more
important in explaining the change in the yield spread for bonds with high credit risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We present a survey of the relevant
literature in Section 2 of the paper, focusing mainly on papers relating to liquidity effects in
corporate bond markets. Section 3 discusses the hypotheses being tested in the paper and the
economic motivation behind them. In Section 4, we explain, in detail, the composition of our data
set and the filters and matching procedures we employ in combining data from four different data
sources. Section 5 discusses the alternative measures of liquidity that have been proposed and
used in the literature and their pros and cons. We focus, in particular, on the relevance of these
measures for a relatively illiquid OTC market. In Section 6 we outline the methodology. Section 7
presents the time-series results, based on panel regressions, and the results for the cross-sectional
analysis based on the Fama-MacBeth procedure, used to test our hypotheses. Section 8 concludes.
2. Literature survey
The academic literature on liquidity effects on asset prices is vast. An early paper was by
Amihud and Mendelson (1986), who first made the conceptual argument that transaction costs
result in liquidity premiums in asset prices in equilibrium, due to different trading horizons of
investors. This conclusion has been extended and modified in different directions and also been
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by Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2006). In the context of OTC markets, Duffie, Garleanu,
and Pedersen (2007) show that transaction costs are driven by search frictions, inventory holding
costs, and bargaining power in this particular market structure. A related argument is presented
in Jankowitsch, Nashikkar, and Subrahmanyam (2011). In a recent paper, Acharya, Amihud, and
Bharath (2009) argue that these frictions change over time and are higher in times of financial
crises, due to binding capital constraints and increased holding and search costs.
The literature on credit risk modeling provides evidence of liquidity effects in the corporate
bond market and shows that risk-free interest rates and credit risk are not the only factors that
drive corporate bond prices. This result has been established based on reduced-form models
(see, for example, Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis, 2005; Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and Mahanti,
2011), and structural models (see, for example, Huang and Huang, 2003), i.e., neither credit risk
measured by the prices of CDS contracts nor asset value information from the equity market, can
fully explain corporate bond yields.
Several authors study the impact of liquidity, based on corporate bond yields or yield spreads
over a risk-free benchmark. Most of these papers rely on indirect proxies based on bond char-
acteristics such as the coupon, age, amount issued, industry, and bond covenants; some papers
additionally use market-related proxies based on trading activity such as trade volume, number of
trades, number of dealers, and the bid-ask spread, see, e.g., Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann
(2001), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), Perraudin and Taylor (2003), Eom, Hel-
wege, and Huang (2004), Liu, Longstaff, and Mandell (2004), Houweling, Mentink, and Vorst
(2005), Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005), De Jong and Driessen (2006), Edwards, Harris, and
Piwowar (2007), and Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath (2009). Essentially, all these papers find that
liquidity is priced in bond yields. However, they find different magnitudes and varying importance
of these basic liquidity proxies, but mostly at the market-wide level.
In the more recent literature, several alternative liquidity measures that are estimators of
transaction costs, market impact, or turnover, have been proposed and applied to analyze liquidity
in the corporate bond market at the level of individual bonds. The Roll measure (see Roll, 1984;
Bao, Pan, and Wang, 2011) interprets the subsequent prices as arising from the “bid-ask bounce”:
thus, the autocovariance in price changes provides a simple liquidity measure. A similar idea to
measure transaction costs is proposed and implemented in the LOT measure proposed by Lesmond,
Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999). The Amihud measure (see Amihud, 2002) relates the price impact of
5a trade to the trade volume. Trading activity itself is used in the zero-return measure based on the
number of unchanged sequential prices and the no-trade measure based on time periods without
trading activity (see, e.g., Chen, Lesmond, and Wei, 2007). Mahanti, Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam,
Chacko, and Mallik (2008) propose another measure known as latent liquidity that is based on the
institutional holdings of corporate bonds, which can be used even in the absence of transaction
data. Jankowitsch, Nashikkar, and Subrahmanyam (2011) develop the price dispersion measure,
which is based on the dispersion of market transaction prices of an asset around its consensus
valuation by market participants.
Most of the early papers on bond market liquidity are based only on quotation data as reason-
ably complete transaction data were not available until a few years ago. However, some papers
use restricted samples of the transaction data for certain parts of the corporate bond market
to analyze liquidity, including Chakravarty and Sarkar (1999), Hong and Warga (2000), Schultz
(2001), and Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002). Many more researchers focused on the issue of liquidity
in the corporate bond market since the TRACE data on US corporate bond transactions started
to become available in 2002. This new source of bond price information allows researchers to
analyze many different aspects of the US corporate bond market; see, e.g., Edwards, Harris, and
Piwowar (2007), Goldstein and Hotchkiss (2007), Mahanti, Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, Chacko,
and Mallik (2008), Ronen and Zhou (2009), Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and Mahanti (2011), Lin,
Wang, and Wu (2011), and Jankowitsch, Nashikkar, and Subrahmanyam (2011).
It is especially interesting to examine how liquidity affects the corporate bond market in times
of financial crisis. While much of the research on the current financial crisis is probably in progress,
two recent papers do provide some early evidence on the impact of liquidity in the US corporate
bond market. These include Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) and Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and Lando
(2011).
Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) use the TRACE data to construct the Roll measure as a proxy
for liquidity. Using a sample of around 1,000 bonds that existed prior to October 2004, they
show that illiquidity measured by the Roll measure is quite significant in this market and much
larger than would be predicted by the bid-ask bounce. They also show that their measure exhibits
commonality across bonds, which tends to go up during periods of market crisis. Further, they
relate the Roll measure to bond yield spreads in a cross-sectional regression setup and provide
evidence that part of the yield spread differences across bonds is due to illiquidity.
Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and Lando (2011) combine the TRACE data using straight bullet
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They use a panel regression based on quarterly data to study the effects of five different liquidity
measures and the defined credit risk variables. In general, they find a significant effect of liquidity,
which increased with the onset of the subprime crisis. However, their multivariate regression
results show somewhat mixed results for different rating classes.
There are several important differences between these prior papers and our own research in this
paper. First, we employ a much larger data set on transaction data on US corporate bonds than
any prior papers, as our sample of 23,703 bonds basically covers the whole traded market. This is
a major difference even compared with the recent work of Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) and Dick-
Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and Lando (2011), who focus only on a certain, generally the more liquid,
subsegment of the market. Second, our research explicitly covers two crisis periods, which are
analyzed separately: the broader subprime crisis and the earlier, GM/Ford crisis, which affected
particular segments of the US corporate bond market. We contrast the behavior of liquidity and
its pricing in bond yield spreads during periods of crisis with more normal periods and analyze
the interaction of credit and liquidity risk. Third, we include the additional information on the
market’s consensus valuation of bonds provided by Markit. These data permit us to estimate the
price dispersion measure for the bonds in our sample and, thus, include an important additional
measure of transaction costs. This liquidity proxy is particularly relevant for our research question,
as transaction cost measures appear to be especially important in explaining liquidity in OTC
markets.
3. Hypotheses
In this section, we provide an overview of the research questions we pose and the hypotheses
we test in our research. Our approach is to examine the validity of specific arguments regarding
the effect of liquidity in the US corporate bond market.
H1: Liquidity is an important price factor in the US corporate bond market.
As argued by Amihud and Mendelson (1986), investors with different trading horizons have
different expected returns, after taking into account the transactions costs they will incur over their
respective horizons. This phenomenon translates into a clientele effect (for securities in positive
net supply) by which the more illiquid assets are cheaper and are held by investors with longer
horizons relative to their liquid counterparts, which are held by those with shorter horizons. Duffie,
Garleanu, and Pedersen (2007) and Jankowitsch, Nashikkar, and Subrahmanyam (2011) argue
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inventory holding costs, and bargaining power. In the corporate bond market context, these
frictions are reflected in the bond prices, whereby liquid bonds earn a lower expected return than
illiquid bonds which are similar on other dimensions, such as bond features and risk characteristics.
The US corporate bond market is especially interesting in this respect, as liquidity differences
across individual bonds seem to be rather pronounced: very few bonds are traded frequently,
while most other bonds are hardly ever traded at all (see Mahanti, Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam,
Chacko, and Mallik (2008) for details of a cross-sectional comparison for the US corporate bond
market). Moreover, trading in the US corporate bond market involves much higher transaction
costs compared to related markets such as the stock market. Thus, we would expect a significant
liquidity premium, as argued in Amihud and Mendelson (1986), and expect that our liquidity
proxies can explain a significant part of bond yield spreads. Our aim is to quantify these liquidity
effects as a priced factor.
H2: Liquidity effects are more important in periods of financial distress.
The liquidity premium in the corporate bond market can be expected to change over time
depending on market conditions, especially during a financial crisis. Several arguments have
been proposed in the literature regarding the behavior of agents in a crisis. For example, Duffie,
Garleanu, and Pedersen (2007) propose that liquidity is more important in crisis periods, since
inventory holding costs and search costs are higher, and also asymmetric information is a more
important issue. Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath (2009) provide empirical support for this hy-
pothesis arguing that banks face more stringent capital requirements when they hold illiquid assets
and could find it more difficult to access liquidity during a crisis. Moreover, a greater proportion
of investors could have shorter horizons in a crisis. For example, bond mutual funds and hedge
funds could face the possibility of redemptions or are forced to meet value-at-risk requirements
and margin calls and, therefore, wish to hold more liquid assets to address this eventuality; see,
e.g., Sadka (2010). Individual investors could shift more of their portfolios from illiquid to liquid
assets as they turn more risk averse. For all these reasons, the gap in pricing between liquid and
illiquid bonds, that are otherwise similar, may widen, resulting in a higher liquidity premium.
Thus, the second and main research question of this paper is whether the effect of liquidity is
stronger during times of financial crises. We expect a particularly strong effect in the subprime
crisis, when capital constraints became binding and inventory holding costs and search costs rose
dramatically for all market participants.
8H3: Liquidity effects are more important for bonds with high credit risk.
We study whether a bond’s credit rating is related to liquidity effects by focusing on the
difference between investment grade and speculative grade bonds. Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath
(2009) show that liquidity is substantially different between investment grade and speculative grade
bonds using a regime switching model. They argue that in periods of financial crisis, all bond prices
decline due to an increase of illiquidity. At the same time, a flight-to-quality effect is expected,
which leads to lower price reactions among investment grade bonds. Chen, Lesmond, and Wei
(2007) also provide empirical support for this argument. Thus, we expect stronger liquidity effects
for speculative grade bonds and to find flight-to-quality effects in periods of crisis.
4. Data description
In this section, we present the unique data set we have at hand for this liquidity study covering
basically the whole US corporate bond market. Our data are drawn from several different sources:
1. Transaction data from the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE),
2. Consensus market valuations from Markit,
3. Credit ratings from Standard & Poor’s,
4. Bond characteristics from Bloomberg,
5. Treasury and swap data from Bloomberg.
Our time period starts with the date when TRACE was fully implemented on October 1, 2004,
and covers the period until December 31, 2008. TRACE provides detailed information about all
transactions in the US corporate bond market, i.e., the actual trade price, the yield based on this
price, as well as the trade volume measured in US dollars for each transaction.1 Phase I of TRACE
was launched by the Financial Industry Regulatory Agency (FINRA) in July 2002, with the aim
of improving transparency in the US corporate bond market. This phase covered only the larger
and generally higher credit quality issues. Phase II expanded the coverage and dissemination of
information to smaller investment grade issues. Since the final Phase III was implemented on
October 1, 2004, transactions of essentially all US corporate bonds have been reported. Hence,
the TRACE database has been reasonably complete since its final implementation. This data
1The reported trade volume is capped at $1 million for high yield and unrated bonds and at $5 million for
investment grade bonds.
9source is almost unique for an OTC market, since in many other cases, price information usually
must be obtained either from an individual dealer’s trading book, which provides a very limited
view of the market, or by using bid-ask quotations instead. In the US corporate bond market,
reporting of any transaction to TRACE is obligatory for broker-dealers and follows a set of rules
approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), whereby all transactions must be
reported within a time frame of 15 minutes.
We use the filters proposed by Dick-Nielsen (2009) for the TRACE data to eliminate potentially
erroneous data points.2 In addition, we follow Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) and apply
a median filter and a reversal filter to eliminate further potential data errors. While the median
filter identifies potential outliers in reported prices within a certain time period, the reversal filter
identifies unusual price movements.3 Eliminating any potential errors in the reported transactions
reduces the number of reported trades by roughly 5.5% to 23.5 million trades. This results in a
TRACE data sample consisting of 34,822 bonds from 4,631 issuers.
An important additional source for the market’s valuation of a bond is obtained from Markit
Group Limited, a leading data provider, specialized in security and derivatives pricing. One of its
services is to gather, validate, and distribute end-of-day composite bond prices from dealer polls.
Up to 30 contributors provide data from their books of record and from feeds to automated trading
systems (see Markit Group Limited, 2006). These reported valuations are averaged for each bond
after eliminating outliers, using their proprietary methodology. Hence, this price information can
be considered as a market-wide average of a particular bond price, reflecting the market consensus.
The Markit valuations are used by many financial institutions to mark their portfolios to market
and have credibility among practitioners. In total, we have 5,522,735 Markit quotes, covering
28,145 bonds in our database.
To control for default risk, we use credit ratings from Standard & Poor’s (S&P). We focus on
long-term, issue credit ratings as the market’s current judgment of the obligor’s creditworthiness
with respect to a specific financial obligation. It should be noted, that in our descriptive statistics
of the rating variable, we assign integer numbers to ratings, i.e., AAA=1, AA+=2, etc., to measure
the “average” rating of certain groups of bonds or time periods. Our time period contains 25,464
bonds, which have at least one S&P credit rating each. Note that credit risk could be measured
2As pointed out by Dick-Nielsen (2009), care should be exercised when accounting for order cancelations or
corrections in the TRACE data. To mitigate the errors that result from these issues, Dick-Nielsen (2009) suggests
that the trade data need to be “cleaned up” using error filters.
3The median filter eliminates any transaction where the price deviates by more than 10% from the daily median
or from a nine-trading-day median centered at the trading day. The reversal filter eliminates any transaction with
an absolute price change deviating from the lead, lag, and average lead/lag price change by at least 10%.
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using alternative approaches. Two prominent examples come to mind: using CDS spreads in
the context of a reduced-form credit risk model, as in Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) and
Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and Mahanti (2011), or using accounting-based and equity-related
data in a structural model context, as in Huang and Huang (2003). We do not incorporate
such proxies as this information is generally only available for a very small (presumably more
liquid) segment of the market and our intention is to explicitly analyze liquidity effects for the
whole market. In addition, the impact of the liquidity on these data inputs would also have to
be taken into account, rendering the analysis far more complex, and hence, prone to additional
error. This issue is particularly true during periods of crisis when liquidity and counterparty risk
considerations are exacerbated in the pricing of CDS as well as equity contracts. Hence, we apply
the more parsimonious approach of using only the credit ratings, with their admitted shortcomings,
in terms of their own error and failure to anticipate changes in credit risk.
For each of the bonds available in TRACE, we additionally obtain bond characteristics from
Bloomberg. These bond characteristics include the issue date, maturity, age, coupon, amount
issued, industry sector, and bond covenants. Most of these characteristics have been considered as
simple liquidity proxies by previous studies. Furthermore, we use swap rates and Treasury rates
for various maturities retrieved from Bloomberg as the benchmark for the risk-free interest rate
curve to compute the corporate bond yield spreads.
Given these data sets, we generate a sample that is representative of the whole market by
merging the daily trade observations from TRACE with end-of-day Markit-quotations, the avail-
able S&P ratings, and the bond characteristics. This sample covers 23,703 bonds of 3,261 firms.
On average per day, we observe 5,423 traded bonds, 21,254 trades, and $ 7.563 billion in vol-
ume. Thus, our panel data set covers approximately 80% of the overall trading activity in the
US corporate bond market. We find that the market coverage is at this high level throughout the
observation period and, hence, is highly representative of the whole US corporate bond market
including bonds with very low trading activity, which is a major difference compared to most other
studies. Nevertheless, a considerable number of bonds is traded only very rarely. However, data
limitations caused by this lack of trading activity should actually bias us against finding any clear
liquidity effects at all.
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5. Liquidity proxies
This section presents the various liquidity proxies that we use in the regression analysis as
explanatory variables. A number of liquidity proxies have been proposed in the literature (see
Section 2) which are not all equally viable, given the challenges of obtaining detailed and sufficiently
frequent data in the relatively illiquid corporate bond market. Our data set allows us to compare
the efficiency of most of these proposed proxies in this empirical study. We classify the available
proxies into three groups: bond characteristics, trading activity variables, and liquidity measures.
Bond characteristics, such as the amount issued, are simple liquidity proxies which provide a
rough indication about the potential liquidity of a bond. Trading activity variables, such as the
number of trades, provide bond-specific information based on transaction data. Liquidity mea-
sures, such as the price dispersion and Amihud measure, are alternative estimators of transaction
costs or market impact.4
All these liquidity proxies can either be calculated on a daily basis, if price information is
observable for a particular bond, or are time-invariant (e.g., coupon), or change linearly with time
(e.g., age). In the following subsections, we present the definitions of the various liquidity proxies
that we use in our analysis and discuss the details of their computation.
5.1. Bond characteristics
The bond characteristics we consider as liquidity proxies are the amount issued, coupon, ma-
turity, and age. These proxies, while admittedly crude measures, make intuitive sense. In general,
we expect bonds with a larger amount issued to be more liquid and bonds with a larger coupon
to be less liquid.5 Bonds with long maturities (over ten years) are generally considered to be less
liquid since they are often bought by “buy-and-hold” investors, who trade infrequently. Similarly,
we expect recently issued (on-the-run) bonds to be more liquid. We consider these measures to be
important only for our cross-sectional analysis, as most of these are either constant (e.g., coupon)
or change linearly (e.g., maturity) over time.
4We are aware that many studies without access to transaction data use the quoted bid-ask spread as a liquidity
proxy. However, bid-ask spreads are, in general, only available for a small subsample representing the relatively
larger issues. In a robustness check we find that bid-ask spreads from Bloomberg are of minor importance once
transaction-based measures are considered, in the empirical specifications we investigate below. These results are
not reported in this paper, but are available from the authors upon request.
5Note that the coupon per se is rather a crude proxy for credit risk. Once we adjust for credit risk (e.g., by using
ratings), bonds with different coupons but with identical credit risk exhibit different levels of liquidity. However, as
we are certainly not able to perfectly adjust for credit risk, the coupon cannot be viewed as a pure liquidity proxy.
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5.2. Trading activity variables
A bond’s trading activity provides information about liquidity. In this sense, higher trading
activity generally indicates higher liquidity. We consider the following trading activity variables:
number of trades, trade volume, and trading interval. We compute the number of trades and the
trade volume of a particular bond on each day from the trading information given by TRACE.
The trading interval is the elapsed time (measured in days) since the last day a given bond was
traded. Longer trade intervals indicate less trading activity and, thus, lower liquidity. Therefore,
we expect liquidity to be higher for bonds with shorter time intervals between trading days.
5.3. Liquidity measures
Amihud measure
This liquidity proxy is a well-known measure originally proposed for the equity market by
Amihud (2002), which is conceptually based on Kyle (1985). It relates the price impact of trades,
i.e., the price change measured as a return, to the trade volume measured in US dollars. The
Amihud measure at day t for a certain bond over a particular time period with Nt observed
returns is defined as the average ratio between the absolute value of these returns rj and its
trading volumes vj , i.e.,
Amihudt =
1
Nt
Nt∑
j=1
|rj |
vj
. (1)
A larger Amihud measure implies that trading a bond causes its price to move more in response
to a given volume of trading, in turn, reflecting lower liquidity. We use the daily volume-weighted
average TRACE prices to generate the returns rj and calculate the Amihud measure on a day-by-
day basis.
Price dispersion measure
A new liquidity measure recently introduced for the OTC market is the price dispersion measure
of Jankowitsch, Nashikkar, and Subrahmanyam (2011). This measure is based on the dispersion of
traded prices around the market-wide consensus valuation. A low dispersion around the valuation
indicates that the bond can be bought close to its fair value and, therefore, represents low trading
costs and high liquidity, whereas high dispersion implies high transaction costs, and hence, low
liquidity. This measure is derived from a market microstructure model and shows that price
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dispersion is the result of market frictions such as inventory risk for dealers and search costs
for investors. It presents a direct estimate of trading costs based on transaction data. As in
Jankowitsch, Nashikkar, and Subrahmanyam (2011), the traded prices are obtained from TRACE
and the market valuations from Markit. The price dispersion measure is defined as the root mean
squared difference between the traded prices and the respective market-wide valuation weighted
by volume, i.e., for each day t and a particular bond, it is given by
Price dispersiont =
√√√√ 1∑Kt
k=1 vk
Kt∑
k=1
(pk −mt)2vk, (2)
where pk and vk represent the Kt observed traded prices and their trade volumes on date t and
mt is the market-wide valuation for that day. Hence, the price dispersion indicates the potential
transaction cost for a trade.
Roll measure
This measure developed by Roll (1984) shows that, under certain assumptions, adjacent price
movements can be interpreted as a bid-ask bounce which, therefore, allows us to estimate the
effective bid-ask spread. This bid-ask bounce results in transitory price movements that are
serially negatively correlated and the strength of this covariation is a proxy for the round-trip
costs for a particular bond, and hence, a measure of liquidity. More precisely, the Roll measure is
defined as
Rollt = 2
√
−Cov(∆pt,∆pt−1), (3)
where ∆pt is the change in prices from t − 1 to t. We compute the Roll measure based on the
daily volume-weighted bond prices pt from the TRACE data set, where we use a rolling window
of 60 days and require at least eight observations to determine the covariance.6
Zero-return measure
The zero-return measure indicates whether we observe a zero price movement between trading
days. The zero-return measure is set to one, if we find an unchanged price, and is set to zero,
6If positive covariances occur, we set the Roll measure to zero. Since we interpret the Roll measure as a
transaction cost metric, we think it is quite reasonable to bound this measure at zero. However, we also compared
the results with two alternatives: preserving the sign in the spirit of Roll (1984) (i.e., positive covariance translates
into a negative Roll measure) and not using these observations at all. Neither of these changes affects the qualitative
nature of our results.
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otherwise. Bond prices that stay constant over long time periods are likely to be less liquid, as
the information could be stale. Obviously, such a measure can only be based on price quotations
or valuations, such as Markit quotes in our case. Constant price information in these data sources
reveal illiquidity as unchanged quotations could indicate an incomplete coverage of the bond.
6. Methodology
This section outlines our general approach to measuring the impact of liquidity and credit risk
on pricing in the US corporate bond market. We present here our definitions of the bond yield
spread and define the subperiods of interest to test our hypotheses about financial crises. We then
present the specifications for our panel data regressions to explore the time-series properties, and
the Fama-MacBeth regressions to explore the cross-sectional properties of our data. We use these
specifications to study market-wide liquidity effects and analyze subsegments of the market, where
we compare investment grade and speculative grade bonds.
6.1. Bond yield spread
The dependent variable in our setup is the corporate bond yield spread, represented by the
yield differential relative to that of a risk-free benchmark. We define this benchmark as the yield
of a risk-free zero-coupon bond with a maturity equal to the duration of the corporate bond. We
compute this duration based on the reported yield in the TRACE database and the corporate
bond’s cash flow structure. Note that we do not incorporate adjustments for optionalities or
covenants included in the bond structure to determine the duration. Overall, yield spreads based
on this duration adjustment can be considered as a proxy for the zero-coupon yield spread taken
from a more complete pricing model.7
We use both the Treasury yield curve and the swap curve as risk-free benchmarks to calculate
the bond yield spreads. We find that the general structure of the resulting yield spread is basically
identical for both benchmarks. However, as expected, the yield spread based on the swap curve is
shifted downwards compared to the spread based on the Treasury curve, indicating that the swap
curve represents market participants with AA ratings with greater credit risk, while the Treasury
curve represents lower credit risk. We conduct all our regression analysis on both spread series;
however, as the results are basically identical, we report only the results for the spreads against
7Given the complexity of these models and the limited information available for their calibration, we presume
that the resulting zero-coupon yield spread would not improve the economic interpretation of our results, in general.
To test this assumption, we have employed regression analyses for a subsample of straight coupon, bullet bonds
without any option features. For this subsample, we find similar results, confirming our conjecture.
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the Treasury benchmark in the empirical results section.
We calculate the bond yield spread for every price observation in the TRACE data set. Thus,
we can have more than one spread observation for a given bond on a particular day, since there can
be multiple trades for the bond on that day. Hence, to get a single value for the yield spread for
each day, we estimate the bond spread from the individual observations by calculating a volume-
weighted average for the day, i.e., we implicitly assume that the spread information is reflected
more strongly in large trades.
6.2. Subperiods of interest
We are interested in how the explanatory power of the independent variables differs in financial
crises compared to normal market environments. Therefore, we define the following three subpe-
riods: The GM/Ford crisis (March 2005 to January 2006) when a segment of the corporate bond
market was affected, the subprime crisis (July 2007 to December 2008), which was much more
pervasive across the corporate bond market, and the normal period in between (February 2006 to
June 2007). We choose the start and end dates of the subperiods based on exceptional events that
are believed to have affected market conditions (see Fig. 1).8
6.3. Panel data regression
We rely on a panel data regression approach to analyze bond yield spread changes. We use
first differences, as we observe that yield spreads are integrated. Since we observe autocorrelated
yield spread changes, we add one autoregressive parameter to our specifications.9 Of course, in
this difference specification, the static bond characteristic variables drop out. Thus, our panel
consists of the pooled time-series of the first differences of the bond yield spread as the dependent
variable and the trading activity variables and liquidity measures as the explanatory variables.
Furthermore, we add changes in rating class dummies to the regression to consider credit risk-
related effects on the yield spread:
∆(Yield spread)i,t = a0 + a1 ·∆(Yield spread)i,t−1 + a2 ·∆(Trading activity variables)i,t
+ a3 ·∆(Liquidity measures)i,t + a4 ·∆(Rating dummies)i,t + i,t.(4)
8Alternative definitions of these subperiods could have been used. Therefore, as a stability test, we varied the
start and end dates of the subperiods by up to one month. However, we find similar results, and hence, report only
results for the three subperiods defined above.
9We investigated alternative specifications of the time-series model, including different lags of the autoregressive
parameters, and find that the results are very similar for these specifications.
16
Our basic time-series data are at a daily frequency. However, because of computational re-
strictions due to the large sample size, we create weekly averages of all variables from the daily
data for each bond. Thus, all the time-series regression results presented in the empirical results
section below are based on weekly data. Note that we use logarithmic values of the traded volume
in the regressions, as is common practice.
6.4. Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression
These regressions are in levels rather than in changes and, therefore, allow a cross-sectional
analysis. In particular, we can test for the importance of static bond characteristics in explaining
the cross-sectional differences in yield spread. The regressions are performed with the following
structure:
(Yield spread)i,t = a0 + a1 · (Bond characteristics)i,t + a2 · (Trading activity variables)i,t
+ a3 · (Liquidity measures)i,t + a4 · (Rating dummies)i,t + i,t. (5)
We run this regression based on weekly averages from the daily data of all variables. Thus, we
have the cross-sectional regression result for each week and we use the Fama-MacBeth procedure
to report the regression parameters and t-statistics. We present the results of this procedure for
the subperiods defined earlier. This approach allows us to analyze liquidity effects in times of
regular market conditions and financial crises, across bonds. Again, we use logarithmic values of
the traded volume and the amount issued in the regressions.
7. Results
7.1. Descriptive statistics
This section provides summary statistics for the US corporate bond market based on our
matched data sample of 23,703 bonds for the period October 2004 to December 2008 (see Section
4). Table 1 reports the cross-sectional variation of the main variables used in our empirical
analysis, i.e., the yield spread, the credit rating, and the liquidity proxies (bond characteristics,
trading activity variables, and liquidity measures). For time-varying explanatory variables, the
statistics are computed as the time averages for each individual bond. The table reports the 5th,
25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles, as well as the mean and standard deviation of each variable.
It provides an aggregate picture of the substantial cross-sectional variation of the variables.
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The yield spread between the 5th and 95th percentiles ranges from 52 to 767 basis points
(bp) with a mean of 287 bp. Part of this enormous variation is obviously due to credit risk given
that our sample contains bonds with credit ratings all the way from AAA (=1) to C (=21). The
average credit rating is roughly eight which corresponds to BBB+ and a standard deviation of
approximately four rating notches.
As is to be expected, there is a reasonable variation in the bond characteristics of amount
issued, coupon, maturity, and age across bonds, e.g., the amount issued varies from just below
$ 5 million to $ 1.25 billion between the 5th and 95th percentiles. Regarding trading activity
variables, we find that the average frequency of bond trading is every 4.5 days. For a bond that
is traded on a particular day, we observe an average of 3.5 trades with an average trade size of
roughly $ 1.4 million dollars, with substantial cross-sectional variation.
Regarding the liquidity measures, the mean value of the Amihud measure is 78.4 bp per million,
which indicates that trading one million dollars in a particular bond shifts the price by 78.4 bp, on
average. The variation in liquidity across bonds is remarkably high and ranges between 0.7 and
260.7 bp, a factor of around 400 for the 5th and the 95th percentiles. The price dispersion indicates
the trading cost of a single transaction for which we observe a mean of around 41.5 bp with high
variation across bonds as well. For the Roll measure, which corresponds to the round-trip costs,
we observe an average value of 185.1 bp. Interestingly, this mean value is more than twice as large
as the mean value of the price dispersion measure. Considering the zero-return measure, we find
that these are mostly zero, indicating only very few observations of stale prices or quotations.
Table 2 presents the correlations between the various liquidity proxies within our panel data.
Overall, we find the expected patterns: in general, there is positive correlation among the trading
activity variables (e.g., the correlation between volume and number of trades is 0.51) and among
the liquidity measures estimating trading costs (e.g., the correlation between Amihud, Roll, and
price dispersion measure is between 0.02 and 0.2). However, the general level of correlation ap-
pears to be relatively low, especially for the liquidity measures. Thus, correlation measured at
the individual bond level over time shows that the liquidity proxies have substantial idiosyncratic
movements. This result suggests that the various liquidity proxies are measuring somewhat differ-
ent aspects of liquidity empirically, although at a conceptual level they are related.10 Therefore,
for our empirical work, the issues of multicollinearity may not be as severe as one may suspect, at
first glance. Note that once correlations in our sample are measured at a more aggregate level (e.g.,
10Along the same lines, a principal component analysis (not reported here) shows that the liquidity proxies can
only be represented by a relatively large number of components.
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averaging across time or across bonds), the correlations are much higher. Thus, it is important
not to analyze the bond market based solely on aggregated data, but also at the level of individual
bonds, as we do here, to distinguish between the effects of the various liquidity proxies.
To gain a better understanding of the time-series behavior of the bond yield spread over the
whole time period, we compute the count-weighted average of the daily yield spreads over all bonds
in our sample.11 Fig. 2 shows this time-series of the market-wide average corporate bond yield
spread, indicating the dramatic increase of the spread during the two crisis periods. Especially
during the subprime crisis, we observe a sharp increase in the yield spread, which rose, on average,
from around 2% to 10%, most likely indicating a far higher risk premium for illiquidity and credit
risk.
7.2. Liquidity effects in corporate bond yield spreads
In this section, we examine whether liquidity effects are priced in the US corporate bond market.
As argued in Section 3, we expect to find a significant liquidity premium in bond yield spreads.
We base our conclusions in this section on our overall sample covering the whole market for the
time period of our sample. We present the empirical results explaining the time-series properties
of the bond yield spread changes with the credit ratings and the liquidity proxies introduced in
Section 5, and using the panel data regression methodology presented in Section 6.
The regressions are based on a sample of data consisting of 691,016 bond-week observations.
The results are shown in Table 3. This table presents four different specifications. In Regression 1,
we use a specification without the liquidity proxies, which is a base case that can be compared to
the other specifications, allowing us to explore the increase in explanatory power after including
liquidity proxies. Note that there is reasonable explanatory power even in this specification, which
includes the information contained in the dummy variables based on the credit ratings and the
persistence of bond yield spreads in terms of first differences measured by the lagged term. The
next three specifications present the results of the panel regressions using the liquidity proxies
(i.e., trading activity variables and liquidity measures).12 Regression 2 reports the results with
the trading activity variables only, while Regression 3 reports them with the liquidity measures
only. Regression 4 includes both types of liquidity proxies.
Focusing on the model that includes both types of proxies, the results of Regression 4 show
11We also examine the behavior of bond yield spreads, weighted by the volume of trading and by the amount
outstanding of the individual bonds, both of which show a similar pattern.
12Since the regressions are based on the change in the bond yield spread, the static bond characteristics, such
as coupon, drop out of the specification since they are fixed effects. Others, such as age, vary linearly with time
and are absorbed in the constant term.
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that all the liquidity proxies are statistically significant in explaining the changes in the bond
yield spreads. Among the trading activity variables, changes in the volume and trading interval
have the highest t-statistics, while among the liquidity measures, changes in the Amihud measure
and the price dispersion measure are most important. Interestingly, despite the correlation across
the liquidity measures, they are sufficiently different across bonds and time that they are all
incrementally relevant in explaining the changes in the bond yield spreads. All variables have
the expected signs except for two liquidity proxies: the number of trades and the zero-return
measure. Regarding the zero-return measure, the economic significance of this measure is very
low, as discussed below. Thus, we assume that this measure might not be meaningful. As for
the number of trades, we find that an increase in the number of trades increases the yield spread.
This result can arise if, in times of crisis, regular trades are split up in smaller trades due to a
general reduction in trade size or sellside pressure, as more institutional orders are broken up to
be placed in the market. This aspect will be analyzed in the next section.
In terms of R2, we find a relative improvement of about 4.2% when the trading activity
variables are added to Regression 1. When we add the liquidity measures to Regression 1, we
find an additional relative improvement of 9.5% in the R2, showing that liquidity measures are
more important compared to the trading activity variables. Overall, we find that liquidity effects
account for approximately 14% of the explained market-wide corporate yield spread changes.
The Amihud measure turns out to be the most important explanatory variable in these re-
gressions in economic terms. A one standard deviation change in the Amihud measure explains
about 6.1 basis points of the change in the bond yield spread in Regression 4.13 Similar statistics
for the price dispersion measure and the Roll measure are 3.4 bp and 3.1 bp, respectively. The
impact of the trading interval, volume, and number of trades are 2.5, 1.8, and 1.5 bp, respectively.
The smallest impact is provided by the zero-return measure (0.8 bp), which seems not to be par-
ticularly relevant given its low economic significance. Considering all liquidity proxies together, a
one standard deviation move in the direction of greater illiquidity in all proxies would increase the
yield spread by 19.2 bp. This effect is important when compared with the volatility of the yield
13Note that the calculation of the economic significance is based on the standard deviation of the first differences
of the variables. Due to space limitations we do not report details concerning these statistics for the first differences.
20
spread changes of 75.6 bp.14,15
Overall, we find in this analysis that liquidity is an important factor driving yield spread
changes. Liquidity measures as well as trading activity variables can explain a fair proportion of
bond yield spread changes; in particular, liquidity measures estimating trading costs seem to be
more important than pure trading activity measures.
7.3. Liquidity effects in periods of financial distress
In this section, we explore whether the effect of liquidity is stronger during times of financial
crises. As argued in Section 3, we expect that liquidity is an even more important factor in times of
distress. To focus on the role of liquidity in financial crises, we analyze three different subperiods
of our overall sample. We present the results for the two different crisis periods (the GM/Ford
crisis and the subprime crisis) and compare them with those for the period in between, which
can be considered as a period with more normal market conditions. We first provide evidence on
the descriptive statistics of the key variables for the three subperiods, and then draw our main
conclusions based on the panel data and Fama-MacBeth regressions introduced in Section 6.
The analysis of the averages of the variables in these three subperiods allows us to gain some
important insights into the causes of the variation (see Table 4.) The top panel of the table
presents the average yield spread and the credit rating as well as information about the average
daily market-wide trading activity (i.e., number of traded bonds, trades, and volume). The bottom
panel provides the liquidity proxies computed for each subperiod.
The average yield spread in the normal period of 1.9% is less than in the GM/Ford crisis with
2.3%, and even less so than in the subprime crisis with 5.0%, documenting the strong impact of
this crisis on yield spreads for the whole market. This evidence is also visible in Fig. 2. The
14Since credit ratings might adjust slowly compared to changes in credit risk, part of the explanatory power of
the liquidity variables in our regressions could result because these variables might be proxies for changes in credit
risk. As a robustness check, we test whether adding future rating changes (i.e., assuming perfect foresight) to the
regressions affects the coefficients of the liquidity variables. In our tests (the results of which are not reported here
to conserve space), we add weekly rating changes for each of the next 12 weeks to the regression equation in column
4 of Table 3. We find that future rating changes are statistically significant, i.e., ratings indeed change slowly.
More importantly, however, we find the same results as in the original regression for the liquidity variables, i.e.,
“perfect-foresight” rating information does not take explanatory power away from the liquidity variables. Thus,
our original results are confirmed and there is no evidence that the liquidity variables are proxies for credit risk
information. Rather, future rating changes explain part of the current changes in yield spreads, in addition to
changes in the liquidity variables. Furthermore, we test whether the liquidity variables can forecast future rating
changes. Again, we find no evidence for this conjecture.
15As a robustness check for the use of ratings as a credit risk proxy, we instead use CDS spreads. We are able to
match a small sample (representing the rather more liquid issues) with 5-year CDS spreads obtained from Markit.
We then repeat our regression analysis using this CDS spread variable. The R2 is only marginally improved in
these regressions and for our liquidity measures, we find essentially the same results as in the analysis based on
ratings, i.e., the coefficients and statistical significance stay at the same levels, thus strengthening the robustness
of our results.
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averages of the market-wide trading activity variables are also illustrative. During both crises,
trading activity is lower, in terms of the number of traded bonds and trade volume, than in the
normal period. This reduction is more severe in the subprime crisis. For example, the number
of bonds traded each day dropped during the subprime crisis, from roughly 6,000 on average,
to a little under 5,200. The volume of trading showed a similar decline. Interestingly, during
the subprime crisis, we find a larger number of trades indicating relatively smaller trade sizes
for this period. Overall, the impact on trading activity is more severe in the subprime crisis,
indicating that the liquidity changes that occurred during the two crisis periods were different.
During the GM/Ford crisis, there was some shuﬄing of bond portfolios to account for the shifts in
credit ratings, particularly in the automobile sector, resulting only in a minor reduction of trading
activity. In contrast, during the subprime crisis, overall market liquidity was affected. This point
is also evidenced by the changes in the average credit rating in the different subperiods. The credit
rating of the average bond traded during the GM/Ford crisis was somewhat worse than during
normal times. In contrast, the credit rating of the average bond traded during the subprime crisis
was better than during normal times, indicating a flight-to-quality during the subprime crisis: the
average rating is 8.8 (close to BBB) for the GM/Ford crisis, 8.4 (between BBB and BBB+) for
the normal period, and 7.6 (between BBB+ and A-) for the subprime crisis.
The bottom panel of Table 4 presents similar evidence for the averages of the daily bond-level
liquidity proxies. All liquidity measures indicate lower liquidity in times of crisis, especially for
the subprime crisis. Considering the average price dispersion measure, as one example, we find
that the average value is higher in both crises (46.4 bp in the GM/Ford crisis and 70.0 bp in the
subprime crisis) compared to the normal period (39.8 bp). With regard to the trading activity
variables, we find that the average daily volume and the trade interval at the bond-level stay
approximately at the same level. However, the number of trades increases in both crises. These
results are consistent with the level of market-wide trading activity, where we find that, in crises,
trading takes place in fewer bonds, with a larger number of smaller size trades.
We next analyze the behavior of the changes in the yield spreads in the different subperiods,
using the panel data regression, as in the previous section, incorporating dummy variables for the
subperiods. More importantly, we include interaction terms between the liquidity proxies with the
dummy variables for the two crisis subperiods. This setup allows us to analyze whether the yield
spread changes are more sensitive to liquidity changes in times of crisis. The results are presented
in Table 5.
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Overall, we find that liquidity is far more important in times of crisis. During the subprime
crisis period, we find that nearly all the liquidity proxies have a statistically significantly higher
impact on the changes in the bond yield spreads. Again, this result suggests that the various
liquidity proxies are measuring somewhat different aspects of liquidity, as already indicated by the
low level of correlation (see Section 7.1.) The most important ones are the price dispersion and
the Amihud measure, where both coefficients basically increase by around 100%. A similar result
can be found for the GM/Ford period, although the effects are not quite as strong. We do not
observe a statistically significant increase in all of the proxies for the GM/Ford period, and also,
the magnitude of the increase seems to be smaller. However, an F -test shows that we can reject
at a 1% level the hypothesis that the interaction terms for each period of crisis are jointly zero.
In terms of the improvement in R2, we find that the inclusion of the interaction terms leads to
an increase from 8.56% to 10.14%, compared to the analysis for the whole time-series, highlighting
the importance of adding these terms. Considering the economic significance, a one standard
deviation move in all proxies in the direction of greater illiquidity would increase the spread by
11.6 bp in the normal period compared to 15.2 bp and 25.9 bp in the GM/Ford and subprime
crisis periods, respectively. Thus, we find a far higher impact of the liquidity proxies in the crisis
periods: the economic significance more than doubles during the subprime crisis and increases
by approximately 30% in the GM/Ford crisis. The ranking of the economic importance of the
individual liquidity proxies in the different time periods stays approximately the same, with the
Amihud measure showing the highest impact in all periods (4.3 bp in the normal period, 5.2 bp in
the GM/Ford period, and 7.7 bp in the subprime period). In sum, we find a significant increase,
in both statistical and economic terms, of the liquidity component in the crisis periods.
To widen the scope of the analysis, we explore the cross-sectional differences in explaining the
bond yield spreads considering all liquidity proxies using the Fama-MacBeth procedure to report
the results for the three subperiods.16 Again, rating class dummies are used to explain credit
risk-related differences in spreads across bonds.
Table 6 provides the detailed results. The findings for the individual measures basically confirm
the results of the panel data analysis, i.e., based on the t-statistics, liquidity measures are more
important than trading activity variables; among the liquidity measures, the Amihud measure
and the price dispersion measures are the most important proxies. As in the panel data analysis,
we find an unexpected sign for the number of trades. Interestingly, the bond characteristics are
16Since the t-statistics of the Fama-MacBeth regression could potentially be biased due to serial correlation, we
additionally calculate results for a cross-sectional regression on time-series averages. This robustness check (not
presented here) shows that the variables are, again, statistically significant.
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important liquidity proxies in explaining the cross-section, as well. The most important one is
the amount issued with a high overall t-statistic. Thus, high outstanding amounts indicate higher
liquidity. The coefficient of the coupon variable indicates higher liquidity for bonds with lower
coupons. As expected, a longer time-to-maturity indicates lower liquidity for bonds in the normal
period and in the GM/Ford crisis. However, the effect is negative for the subprime period. This
result could indicate that, for “buy-and-hold” bonds with long maturities, the selling pressure was
not as high as for bonds with shorter maturities resulting in lower spreads.
We find that a large part of the cross-sectional differences in the yield spread across bonds
can be explained by our specification, indicated by an R2 ranging between 49.7% to 60.2% in the
three subperiods. The relative improvement in R2 when considering the liquidity proxies (not
presented in the tables) is around 10%. Interestingly, this ratio stays at the same level in all three
subperiods. Thus, we cannot observe an increase of explanatory power due to liquidity proxies in
the crisis periods. It seems that especially in the subprime crisis, the spread levels of all bonds
increased, and thus, the cross-sectional variation did not change dramatically. Considering the
credit risk component of the yield spreads, the results clearly show the importance of the rating
class dummies in the cross-section, as the remaining 90% of the explanatory power stems from
this credit risk proxy. However, the lower R2 in the subprime crisis results from a decrease in
the explanatory power of the credit ratings, indicating that ratings could have become stale and
reacted rather slowly to the increase in credit risk.
When analyzing the economic effect, we find that the cross-sectional variation of the yield
spread measured by the standard deviation is 200.5 bp. With regard to the economic effect of the
liquidity proxies based on the Fama-MacBeth regressions, we find statistically significant results,
in terms of the coefficients of the relevant dummy variables: e.g., the Amihud measure and the
price dispersion measure show strong effects; a one standard deviation change explains around
12.1 bp and 17.1 bp, respectively. The effects are more pronounced in the crisis periods compared
to the normal period, e.g., for the price dispersion measure, the economic significance is 11.3 bp
in the normal period vs. 15.4 bp and 24.4 bp in the GM/Ford and subprime crisis, respectively.
Again, the zero-return measure shows the lowest economic effect of around 2.5 bp. A one standard
deviation move in all the liquidity proxies in the direction of greater illiquidity would increase the
spread by 98.9 bp in the normal period, compared to 111.9 bp and 153.1 bp, respectively, in the
GM/Ford and subprime crisis periods. Thus, we find a higher impact of the liquidity proxies in
the crises periods.17
17As a robustness test for causality between liquidity proxies and yield spreads, we estimated all cross-sectional
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Overall, the panel data and Fama-MacBeth regressions show a significant increase, in both
statistical and economic terms, of the liquidity component in the crisis periods. We observe a
dramatic increase in the liquidity premium, especially during the subprime crisis. Furthermore,
we find that beyond liquidity measures and trading activity variables, simple bond characteristics,
such as the amount issued, are also of importance in explaining liquidity.
7.4. Interaction effects between liquidity and credit ratings
In this section, we explore whether the effect of liquidity is related to credit risk measured
by credit ratings. We divide the bonds into investment grade (AAA to BBB-) and speculative
grade (BB+ to C/CCC), expecting the liquidity effects of speculative grade bonds to be more
pronounced. This analysis allows us to explore the interaction between credit and liquidity risk.
We expect to find lower liquidity effects for investment grade bonds compared to speculative grade
bonds, as argued in Section 3.
Fig. 3 shows the yield spreads for the two time-series at the market-wide level. As expected,
the bond yield spread for investment grade bonds is always lower than that for speculative bonds.
However, we stress three important points here: First, the GM/Ford crisis is mainly reflected in
the speculative grade yield spreads, as the GM/Ford bonds were downgraded to junk bond status
and probably had spillover effects in the whole corporate bond market. Second, in the normal pe-
riod, the difference between the spreads of investment and speculative grade bonds systematically
shrank over time reflecting decreasing risk premiums, a phenomenon that has received widespread
attention in the popular press. Third, in the subprime crisis, the spread series for both investment
and speculative grade bonds increased dramatically.
Table 7 (Panel A) presents the descriptive statistics of the yield spread, credit rating, and
market-wide trading activity for the two subsegments in the three different time periods. We find
that, in general, trading is focused on the investment grade segment. In the GM/Ford crisis, we
observe a higher level of trading activity for the speculative grade segment compared with the
normal period, perhaps due to the trade volume caused by a shuﬄing of bonds, due to clientele
preferences in anticipation of, and as a consequence of, the downgrades. In the subprime crisis,
we observe a lower market-wide volume for both segments. Furthermore, we find a significant
reduction in the number of traded bonds and trades for the speculative grade segment, whereas
we observe approximately the same number of bonds and more trades in the case of investment
regressions using liquidity variables lagged by one week instead of contemporaneous ones. We find that the lagged
liquidity proxies show basically the same explanatory power as the contemporaneous proxies in the cross-sectional
regressions.
25
grade bonds. Thus, we find a flight-to-quality indicated by trading in better rated bonds compared
to the normal period.
Table 7 (Panel B) presents the descriptive statistics of the liquidity proxies for the two subseg-
ments. In general, we find that the liquidity proxies clearly indicate lower liquidity for speculative
grade bonds, e.g., the price dispersion measure is 44.1 bp vs. 38.8 bp for investment grade bonds
in the normal period. In the crisis periods, the liquidity of bonds in both groups deteriorates, e.g.,
the price dispersion measure for speculative grade bonds is 55.8 bp and 68.2 bp in the GM/Ford
and the subprime crisis, respectively. Interestingly, the difference in the liquidity proxies between
the two groups is less pronounced in the subprime crises for the price dispersion and Roll measure,
i.e., the average trading cost increases relatively more for the investment grade segment. However,
for the Amihud measure we find a large difference between investment and speculative grade bonds
in the subprime crisis (i.e., 75.1 bp vs. 147.9 bp) indicating that large trades in speculative grade
bonds have a high price impact.
Table 8 presents the results for the panel data regressions using a dummy variable for specula-
tive grade bonds and, more important, including interaction terms between this dummy and the
liquidity proxies. Overall, we find that speculative grade bonds react more strongly to changes in
liquidity. The Amihud measure, the price dispersion measure, and the trading activity parameters
are significantly higher (in absolute terms) for speculative grade bonds. Thus, we find a significant
interaction between credit and liquidity risk. On average, bonds with higher credit risk are less
liquid and react more strongly to liquidity changes. The most important ones are the Amihud
and the price dispersion measure, for which both coefficients basically increase by 50%. An F -test
reveals that we can reject at a 1% level the hypothesis that the interaction terms between credit
and liquidity risk are jointly zero.
As for the improvement in R2, we find that the inclusion of the interaction terms leads to an
increase from 8.56% to 9.54% compared to the analysis for the whole time-series, highlighting the
importance of adding these terms. Considering the economic significance, a one standard deviation
move in all proxies in the direction of greater illiquidity would increase the spread by 13.8 bp for
investment grade bonds, compared to 37.6 bp for speculative grade bonds, respectively. Thus,
we find a higher impact of the liquidity proxies for bonds with high credit risk. The ranking of
the economic importance of the individual liquidity proxies for investment grade and speculative
grade bonds stays approximately the same, with the Amihud measure showing the highest impact
(4.6 bp for investment grade bonds and 10.4 bp for speculative grade bonds).18
18In other tests, not reported here due to space constraints, we also estimated a panel data regression separately
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Overall, we find that the liquidity effects are far more pronounced for speculative grade bonds
and, thus, indicating an interaction between credit and liquidity risk. This effect is particularly
important for the subprime crisis, when we observe a clear flight-to-quality effect.
8. Conclusion
Financial economists have been concerned with the impact of liquidity and liquidity risk on
the pricing of assets for at least two decades. During this period, several issues relating to liq-
uidity effects in asset prices have been analyzed at a theoretical and empirical level by academic
researchers, particularly in the context of US equity markets. More recently, the focus on liquidity
has been broadened to include a wider class of assets such as derivatives and fixed income securi-
ties. This trend has accelerated since the onset of the subprime crisis, as the discussion of liquidity
has attracted much interest among academics, practitioners, and regulators. While the crisis has
manifested itself in almost every financial market in the world, the most stressed markets, by far,
have been those for fixed income securities and their derivatives, particularly those with credit
risk, including corporate bonds, CDSs, and CDOs. These developments require that the scope of
the discussion of liquidity be extended to include the interplay between liquidity and credit.
Corporate bond markets are far less liquid than related equity markets, since only a very small
proportion of the universe of corporate bonds trades even as often as once a day. In addition,
corporate bonds trade in an over-the-counter market, where there is no central market place.
Hence, conventional transaction metrics of liquidity such as bid-offer quotes do not have the same
meaning in this market compared to exchange traded markets. The issue of liquidity in this
relatively illiquid, OTC market is fundamentally different from that in exchange traded markets:
Thus, it is necessary to use measures of liquidity that go beyond the standard transaction-based
measures common in research in more liquid, exchange traded markets.
We employ a wide range of liquidity measures to quantify the liquidity effects in corporate
bond yield spreads. Our analysis explores the time-series and cross-sectional aspects of liquidity
using panel and Fama-MacBeth regressions, respectively. We find that the liquidity proxies in the
specified regression models account for about 14% of the explained time-series variation of the
yield spread changes. Furthermore, we find that the effect of the liquidity measures is far stronger
in both the GM/Ford crisis and the subprime crisis, most remarkably the economic effect more
for each subsegment using dummy variables with interaction terms for the subperiods. This allows us to compare
liquidity effects in different time periods between the investment grade and speculative grade bonds. For the
subprime crisis, we find a significant increase in the liquidity proxies for both subsegments, where the increase is
particularly strong for speculative grade bonds. This result reinforces the findings of the previous analysis.
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than doubles in the subprime crisis. All the liquidity proxies considered exhibit statistically as
well as economically significant results. In particular, measures estimating trading costs based on
transaction data show the strongest effects.
Comparing investment grade to speculative grade bonds, we find lower liquidity for speculative
grade bonds as well as a stronger reaction to changes in liquidity. These results show that bonds
with higher credit risk also are more exposed to liquidity risk.
These results are useful for many practical applications, particularly pricing and risk man-
agement, and also have implications for regulatory policy. They also highlight the importance
of transparency of trades for OTC markets, with reporting to a central authority being a crucial
element for price discovery.
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Fig. 1. Timeline showing important events in the U.S. corporate bond market, since March 2005. Based
on these events, we identified three different regimes: the GM/Ford crisis between March 2005 and January
2006, the normal period from February 2006 to June 2007, with no exceptional events, and the subprime
crisis that started in July 2007.
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Fig. 2. This figure shows the market-wide corporate bond yield spread between October 2004 and
December 2008 computed by averaging the bond yield spreads across bonds traded. The corporate bond
yield spread is measured relative to the US Treasury bond yield curve and given in percentage points.
The data set consists of 23,703 U.S. corporate bonds traded over the period October 2004 to December
2008.
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Table 3
This table reports the panel data regression models explaining the yield spread changes based on
weekly averages of all variables:
∆(Yield spread)i,t = α0 + α1 · ∆(Yield spread)i,t−1 + α2 · ∆(Volume)i,t + α3 · ∆(Trades)i,t
+ α4 · ∆(Trading interval)i,t + α5 · ∆(Amihud)i,t + α6 · ∆(Price dispersion)i,t
+ α7 · ∆(Roll)i,t + α8 · ∆(Zero-return)i,t +∑21k=1 βk · ∆(Rating dummy)i,t,k + i,t.
The yield spread change is explained by the change in the lagged yield spread, trading activity variables
(traded volume, number of trades, and time interval between trades), liquidity measures (Amihud, price
dispersion, Roll, and zero-return measure), and rating dummies to control for credit risk. The corporate
bond yield spread is measured relative to the US Treasury bond yield curve. In Regression (1) we use
a specification without the liquidity proxies. Regression (2) reports the results with the trading activity
variables only, while Regression (3) reports them with the liquidity measures only. In Regression (4) we
add both types of liquidity proxies. The t-statistics are given in parentheses and are calculated from
Newey and West (1987) standard errors, which are corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
In addition, the table also reports each model’s R2 and the number of observations. The data set consists
of 23,703 U.S. corporate bonds traded over the period October 2004 to December 2008.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.0731∗∗∗ 0.0726∗∗∗ 0.0721∗∗∗ 0.0717∗∗∗
(73.6195) (76.4741) (76.0680) (77.1532)
∆(Yield spread)i,t−1 −0.2853∗∗∗ −0.2825∗∗∗ −0.2816∗∗∗ −0.2797∗∗∗
(73.6195) (-44.1891) (-43.7139) (-44.0573)
∆(Volume)i,t −0.0204∗∗∗ −0.0108∗∗∗
(-23.2748) (-12.9274)
∆(Trades)i,t 0.0067
∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗
(16.0245) (12.8891)
∆(Trading interval)i,t 0.0068
∗∗∗ 0.0070∗∗∗
(19.4614) (20.2071)
∆(Amihud)i,t 0.0502
∗∗∗ 0.0477∗∗∗
(35.0938) (33.8126)
∆(Price dispersion)i,t 0.0744
∗∗∗ 0.0702∗∗∗
(26.7098) (25.4506)
∆(Roll)i,t 0.0510
∗∗∗ 0.0512∗∗∗
(16.0256) (16.1036)
∆(Zero-return)i,t −0.0774∗∗∗ −0.0696∗∗∗
(-8.4762) (-7.6153)
∆(Rating dummies) Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0735 0.0766 0.0839 0.0856
Observations 691,016 691,016 691,016 691,016
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Table 4
Panel A shows the mean and standard deviation for the yield spread, credit rating, and daily market-
wide trading activity in the three regimes (GM/Ford crisis, normal period, and subprime crisis). The
corporate bond yield spread is measured relative to the US Treasury bond yield curve and given in
percentage points. We use credit ratings from Standard & Poor’s where we assign integer numbers to
ratings, i.e., AAA=1, AA+=2, etc., to measure the average rating. The market-wide trading activity
variables represent the number of traded bonds and trades, and the total trading volume per day. Panel B
shows the mean and the standard deviation for the bond characteristics (amount issued, coupon, maturity,
and age), trading activity variables (traded volume, number of trades, and time interval between trades),
and liquidity measures (Amihud, price dispersion, Roll, and zero-return measure). The data set consists
of 23,703 U.S. corporate bonds traded over the period October 2004 to December 2008.
Panel A: Yield-spread, rating, and market-wide trading activity
Mean Standard deviation
GM/Ford Normal Subprime GM/Ford Normal Subprime
crisis period crisis crisis period crisis
Yield spread (%) 2.34 1.88 5.00 0.43 0.25 2.38
Rating 8.82 8.38 7.63 0.15 0.36 0.28
Traded bonds (thd) 5.23 5.92 5.19 0.54 0.42 0.53
Market-wide trades (thd) 20.43 20.71 22.77 2.34 2.05 4.67
Market-wide volume (bln) 7.65 8.06 6.99 1.32 1.41 1.56
Panel B: Liquidity proxies
Mean Standard deviation
GM/Ford Normal Subprime GM/Ford Normal Subprime
crisis period crisis crisis period crisis
Amount issued (bln) 0.43 0.45 0.54 0.01 0.03 0.06
Coupon (%) 6.26 6.24 6.23 0.06 0.05 0.05
Maturity (yr) 7.57 7.75 8.31 0.13 0.20 0.18
Age (yr) 3.91 4.36 4.76 0.09 0.12 0.14
Volume (mln) 1.51 1.44 1.53 0.26 0.22 0.32
Trades 4.48 4.06 5.33 0.48 0.24 1.31
Trading interval (dy) 3.31 3.38 3.37 0.44 0.49 0.48
Amihud (bp per mln) 66.48 53.21 89.20 6.13 7.42 35.75
Price dispersion (bp) 46.36 39.75 70.02 4.33 1.83 21.84
Roll (bp) 164.28 142.82 209.77 9.57 10.57 52.34
Zero-return (%) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01
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Table 5
This table reports the panel data regression model explaining the yield spread changes based on
weekly averages of all variables:
∆(Yield spread)i,t = α0 + α1 · ∆(Yield spread)i,t−1 + α2 · ∆(Volume)i,t + α3 · ∆(Trades)i,t
+ α4 · ∆(Trading interval)i,t + α5 · ∆(Amihud)i,t + α6 · ∆(Price dispersion)i,t + α7 · ∆(Roll)i,t
+ α8 · ∆(Zero-return)i,t + (GM/Ford dummy)t ×
[
β1 · ∆(Yield spread)i,t−1 + β2 · ∆(Volume)i,t
+ β3 · ∆(Trades)i,t + β4 · ∆(Trading interval)i,t + β5 · ∆(Amihud)i,t + β6 · ∆(Price dispersion)i,t
+ β7 · ∆(Roll)i,t + β8 · ∆(Zero-return)i,t
]
+ (Subprime dummy)t ×
[
γ1 · ∆(Yield spread)i,t−1
+ γ2 · ∆(Volume)i,t + γ3 · ∆(Trades)i,t + γ4 · ∆(Trading interval)i,t + γ5 · ∆(Amihud)i,t
+ γ6 · ∆(Price dispersion)i,t + γ7 · ∆(Roll)i,t + γ8 · ∆(Zero-return)i,t
]
+
∑21
k=1 δk · ∆(Rating dummy)i,t,k + i,t.
The yield spread change is explained by the change in the lagged yield spread, trading activity variables
(traded volume, number of trades, and time interval between trades), liquidity measures (Amihud, price
dispersion, Roll, and zero-return measure), and rating dummies to control for credit risk. Additionally, we
add interaction terms between the subperiod dummies and the liquidity proxies. The corporate bond yield
spread is measured relative to the US Treasury bond yield curve. The t-statistics are given in parentheses
and are calculated from Newey and West (1987) standard errors, which are corrected for heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation. We provide an F -test to test whether the interaction terms of the dummy variable
with the liquidity proxies are jointly zero. The standard errors of the F -statistics are also Newey and West
(1987) corrected. In addition, the table also reports the model’s R2 and the number of observations. The
data set consists of 23,703 U.S. corporate bonds traded over the period October 2004 to December 2008.
Intercept 0.0644∗∗∗ (70.5469)
∆(Yield spread)i,t−1 −0.4318∗∗∗ (-47.6400)
∆(Volume)i,t −0.0137∗∗∗ (-15.8406)
∆(Trades)i,t 0.0030
∗∗∗ (7.3703)
∆(Trading interval)i,t 0.0032
∗∗∗ (7.8087)
∆(Amihud)i,t 0.0332
∗∗∗ (19.7728)
∆(Price dispersion)i,t 0.0417
∗∗∗ (13.0552)
∆(Roll)i,t 0.0080
∗∗∗ (2.7972)
∆(Zero-return)i,t −0.0495∗∗∗ (-4.5916)
(GM/Ford dummy)t ×∆(Yield spread)i,t−1 0.0366∗∗∗ (3.6263)
(GM/Ford dummy)t ×∆(Volume)i,t −0.0028∗∗ (-1.9884)
(GM/Ford dummy)t ×∆(Trades)i,t 0.0019∗∗∗ (2.6333)
(GM/Ford dummy)t ×∆(Trading interval)i,t −0.0040∗∗∗ (-6.1069)
(GM/Ford dummy)t ×∆(Amihud)i,t 0.0069∗∗∗ (2.6422)
(GM/Ford dummy)t ×∆(Price dispersion)i,t 0.0046 (0.9846)
(GM/Ford dummy)t ×∆(Roll)i,t −0.0029 (-0.7340)
(GM/Ford dummy)t ×∆(Zero-return)i,t 0.0239 (1.3503)
(Subprime dummy)t ×∆(Yield spread)i,t−1 0.2260∗∗∗ (19.5475)
(Subprime dummy)t ×∆(Volume)i,t 0.0135∗∗∗ (6.5583)
(Subprime dummy)t ×∆(Trades)i,t 0.0039∗∗∗ (4.4352)
(Subprime dummy)t ×∆(Trading interval)i,t −0.0070∗∗∗ (-8.2507)
(Subprime dummy)t ×∆(Amihud)i,t 0.0266∗∗∗ (9.4860)
(Subprime dummy)t ×∆(Price dispersion)i,t 0.0529∗∗∗ (9.4447)
(Subprime dummy)t ×∆(Roll)i,t 0.0777∗∗∗ (13.6655)
(Subprime dummy)t ×∆(Zero-return)i,t −0.0824∗∗∗ (-3.5895)
∆(Rating dummies) Yes
F -stat. H0: (GM/Ford dummy)×∆(Liquidity proxies) = 0 7.8864
F -stat. H0: (Subprime dummy)×∆(Liquidity proxies) = 0 64.3814
Observations 691,016
R2 0.1014
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Table 6
This table reports the cross-sectional regression models explaining the weekly averages of yield spreads
based on the Fama-MacBeth procedure, estimated for the three regimes (GM/Ford crisis, normal period,
and subprime crisis):
(Yield spread)i,t = α0 + α1 · (Amount issued)i,t + α2 · (Coupon)i,t + α3 · (Maturity)i,t
+ α4 · (Age)i,t + α5 · (Volume)i,t + α6 · (Trades)i,t + α7 · (Trading interval)i,t
+ α8 · (Amihud)i,t + α9 · (Price dispersion)i,t + α10 · (Roll)i,t + α11 · (Zero-return)i,t
+
∑21
k=1 βk · (Rating dummy)i,t,k + i,t.
The level of the yield spread is explained by bond characteristics (amount issued, coupon, maturity, and
age), trading activity variables (traded volume, number of trades, and time interval between trades),
liquidity measures (Amihud, price dispersion, Roll, and zero-return measure), and rating dummies to
control for credit risk. The corporate bond yield spread is measured relative to the US Treasury bond
yield curve. The t-statistics are given in parentheses and are calculated from Newey and West (1987)
standard errors, which are corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The table also reports
each model’s R2, and the number of observations, representing the average number of bonds in the weekly
cross-sectional regressions. The data set consists of 23,703 U.S. corporate bonds traded over the period
October 2004 to April 2008.
GM/Ford crisis Normal period Subprime crisis
Intercept 1.8476∗∗∗ 1.4437∗∗∗ 4.4413∗∗∗
(16.2425) (24.7543) (3.7724)
(Amount issued)i,t −0.2539∗∗∗ −0.1824∗∗∗ −0.3250∗∗∗
(-27.2371) (-14.5819) (-10.0361)
(Coupon)i,t 0.1567
∗∗∗ 0.1142∗∗∗ 0.3506∗∗
(5.8644) (27.9038) (2.3741)
(Maturity)i,t 0.0110
∗∗∗ 0.0177∗∗∗ −0.0599∗∗∗
(3.6594) (11.6510) (-3.6448)
(Age)i,t 0.0053
∗∗ −0.0038 −0.0430∗∗∗
(2.4118) (-0.8124) (-3.2945)
(Volume)i,t 0.0013 −0.0113∗∗ 0.0432∗∗
(0.2851) (-2.4204) (2.4711)
(Trades)i,t 0.0452
∗∗∗ 0.0316∗∗∗ 0.0335∗
(16.7888) (13.4338) (1.8092)
(Trading interval)i,t 0.0073
∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗ 0.0062
(6.0842) (1.9338) (1.0638)
(Amihud)i,t 0.0864
∗∗∗ 0.0718∗∗∗ 0.1696∗∗∗
(28.4551) (29.4427) (12.5740)
(Price dispersion)i,t 0.3496
∗∗∗ 0.2742∗∗∗ 0.4523∗∗∗
(14.0045) (18.8816) (7.8913)
(Roll)i,t 0.0721
∗∗∗ 0.0808∗∗∗ 0.1133∗
(8.2594) (23.4407) (1.9265)
(Zero-return)i,t 0.2371
∗∗∗ 0.0387 0.6128
(4.1320) (0.7780) (1.5735)
(Rating dummies) Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.5905 0.6016 0.4966
Observations 3,815 3,845 3,187
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Table 7
This table reports the mean of the yield spread, the credit rating, and the daily market-wide trading
activity in Panel A for investment grade and speculative grade bonds for the three different regimes
(GM/Ford crisis, normal period, and subprime crisis). The corporate bond yield spread is measured
relative to the US Treasury bond yield curve and given in percentage points. We use credit ratings from
Standard & Poor’s where we assign integer numbers to ratings, i.e., AAA=1, AA+=2, etc., to measure
the average rating. The market-wide trading activity variables represent the number of traded bonds
and trades, and the total trading volume per day. Panel B provides the averages for the trading activity
variables (traded volume, number of trades, and time interval between trades) and liquidity measures
(Amihud, price dispersion, Roll, and zero-return measure). The data set consists of 23,703 U.S. corporate
bonds traded over the period October 2004 to December 2008.
Panel A: Yield-spread, rating, and market-wide trading activity
Investment grade Speculative grade
GM/Ford Normal Subprime GM/Ford Normal Subprime
crisis period crisis crisis period crisis
Yield spread (%) 1.19 0.97 3.21 4.41 3.48 10.82
Rating 6.50 6.01 5.88 13.10 13.44 14.12
Traded bonds (thd) 3.23 3.90 3.96 1.99 2.02 1.22
Market-wide trades (thd) 11.53 13.10 18.11 8.90 7.61 4.66
Market-wide volume (bln) 5.26 6.01 5.66 2.38 2.04 1.33
Panel B: Liquidity proxies
Investment grade Speculative grade
GM/Ford Normal Subprime GM/Ford Normal Subprime
crisis period crisis crisis period crisis
Volume (mln) 1.99 1.91 1.77 1.29 0.96 1.08
Trades 4.37 4.12 5.86 4.77 3.94 4.24
Trading interval (dy) 3.28 3.30 3.28 3.18 3.37 3.49
Amihud (bp per mln) 61.27 50.47 75.14 68.76 54.69 147.94
Price dispersion (bp) 44.74 38.78 72.72 55.79 44.09 68.22
Roll (bp) 154.70 128.83 206.68 183.47 164.95 215.64
Zero-return (%) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.06
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Table 8
This table reports the panel data regression model explaining the yield spread changes based on
weekly averages of all variables:
∆(Yield spread)i,t = α0 + α1 · ∆(Yield spread)i,t−1 + α2 · ∆(Volume)i,t + α3 · ∆(Trades)i,t
+ α4 · ∆(Trading interval)i,t + α5 · ∆(Amihud)i,t + α6 · ∆(Price dispersion)i,t + α7 · ∆(Roll)i,t
+ α8 · ∆(Zero-return)i,t + (Speculative grade dummy)t ·
[
β1 · ∆(Yield spread)i,t−1 + β2 · ∆(Volume)i,t
+ β3 · ∆(Trades)i,t + β4 · ∆(Trading interval)i,t + β5 · ∆(Amihud)i,t + β6 · ∆(Price dispersion)i,t
+ β7 · ∆(Roll)i,t + β8 · ∆(Zero-return)i,t
]
+
∑21
k=1 δk · ∆(Rating dummy)i,t,k + i,t.
The yield spread change is explained by the change in the lagged yield spread, trading activity variables
(traded volume, number of trades, and time interval between trades), liquidity measures (Amihud, price
dispersion, Roll, and zero-return measure), and rating dummies to control for credit risk. Additionally, we
add interaction terms between the subsegment of speculative grade bonds and the liquidity proxies. The
corporate bond yield spread is measured relative to the US Treasury bond yield curve. The t-statistics are
given in parentheses and are calculated from Newey and West (1987) standard errors, which are corrected
for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. We provide an F -test to test whether the interaction terms of
the dummy variable with the liquidity proxies are jointly zero. The standard errors of the F -statistics are
also Newey and West (1987) corrected. In addition, the table also reports the model’s R2 and the number
of observations. The data set consists of 23,703 U.S. corporate bonds traded over the period October 2004
to December 2008.
Intercept 0.0757∗∗∗ (73.5243)
∆(Yield spread)i,t−1 −0.3034∗∗∗ (-35.2591)
∆(Volume)i,t −0.0038∗∗∗ (-3.6157)
∆(Trades)i,t 0.0057
∗∗∗ (8.9298)
∆(Trading interval)i,t 0.0070
∗∗∗ (15.1603)
∆(Amihud)i,t 0.0458
∗∗∗ (25.4481)
∆(Price dispersion)i,t 0.0803
∗∗∗ (20.8335)
∆(Roll)i,t 0.0602
∗∗∗ (13.5645)
∆(Zero-return)i,t −0.0833∗∗∗ (-3.5542)
(Speculative grade dummy)t ×∆(Yield spread)i,t−1 0.0377∗∗∗ (3.2552)
(Speculative grade dummy)t ×∆(Volume)i,t −0.0122∗∗∗ (-4.9216)
(Speculative grade dummy)t ×∆(Trades)i,t 0.0015 (1.3913)
(Speculative grade dummy)t ×∆(Trading interval)i,t −0.0097∗∗∗ (-9.5900)
(Speculative grade dummy)t ×∆(Amihud)i,t 0.0246∗∗∗ (7.6564)
(Speculative grade dummy)t ×∆(Price dispersion)i,t 0.0315∗∗∗ (4.5624)
(Speculative grade dummy)t ×∆(Roll)i,t −0.0010 (-0.1301)
(Speculative grade dummy)t ×∆(Zero-return)i,t −0.0085 (-0.3184)
∆(Rating dummies) Yes
F -stat. H0: (Speculative grade dummy)×∆(Liquidity proxies) = 0 28.8800
Observations 637,814
R2 0.0954
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